The present text comments on a paper by Daniel Steel, in which the author claims to extent from the deterministic to the general case the result according to which the causal Markov condition is satised by systems with jointly independent exogenous variables. I show that Steel's claim cannot be accepted unless one is prepared to abandon standard causal modeling terminology. Correlatively, I argue that the most fruitful aspect of Steel's paper consists in a realist conception of error terms and I show how this conception sheds new light on the relationship between determinism and the causal Markov condition.
Introduction
Despite the stir that Spirtes et al. 1993 or Pearl 2000 caused in the philosophical community, it must be recognized that, in one way or another (see Williamson 2002 for a suggestion to that eect), Bayesian networks can contribute to infer causal knowledge from statistical data. Still they can be used for causal inference purposes only when the causal Markov condition (CMC" from now onwards) holds. Roughly, this condition states that every phenomenon is probabilistically independent from all its non-eects conditional on its direct causes. Whether, or rather when, it holds remains a debated question.
It is usually mentioned in favor of the CMC that it is true for deterministic systems with jointly independent exogenous variables. 1 Reciprocally, counterexamples to the CMC often involve indeterminism. Now, Steel 2005 claims to establish that the determinism clause of the case for the CMC is unnecessary that the CMC is true as soon as exogenous variables are jointly independent. If correct, Steel's thesis should constitute an important contribution to the CMC debate, and to the larger debate on the possibility to infer causal knowledge from statistical data.
In the present paper, I ponder the correctness of Steel's claim and the contribution of Steel 2005 to the CMC debate. A general presentation of the CMCdeterminism issue is given in Section 2. Then, Section 3 sets out Steel's argument. Section 4 assesses it, and leads to conclude that Steel's claim cannot be accepted unless standard terminology is abandoned. Nevertheless, Section 5 supports that Steel makes an interesting suggestion as to the representation of causal systems, and shows how this suggestion sheds new light on the relationship between determinism and the CMC.
Determinism and the CMC
The CMC is the causal version of the more general Markov condition:
Denition 1 (Markov condition) Let V be a nite set of variables, G a directed acyclic over V and p a probability distribution over V. (G, p) satises the Markov condition if and only if every variable in V is probabilistically independent from all its non-descendants in G conditional on its parents in G.
Let us now consider a system" that is, in the present context, any group of causally interrelated phenomena. A simple example introduced by Halpern and Pearl (2005, 848) consists in a forest that can catch re because of either lightning or a match lit by an arsonist. This system can be represented by:
1. the variables L, A, F respectively representing whether lightning strikes, whether an arsonist lights a match in the forest, and whether there is a forest re. 2 More precisely, L is the binary variable which takes the value 1 if and only if lightning strikes and 0 otherwise, and so on for A and F ;
2. the directed graph L r r j F% A representing the direct causal relationships among the variables L, A and F . This graph is the causal graph" over {L, A, F } or, equivalently, the causal graph for the system under consideration;
3. the probability distribution over {L, A, F }.
More generally, any system can be represented by a set of variables and the causal graph and probability distribution over this set. Correlatively, the causal version of the Markov condition can be dened as a property of systems:
Denition 2 (Causal Markov condition) Let S be a system represented by the set of variables V, the acyclic causal graph CG and the probability distribution p over V.
S satises the causal Markov condition if and only if (CG, p) satises the Markov condition.
Let me introduce some vocabulary before I set out the usual result concerning the CMC and determinism: -a system S whose relevant observable aspects are represented by the variables in V is:
-acyclic if and only if CG is acyclic; -deterministic if and only if the values of the V variables with direct causes in V are functionally determined by the values of these direct causes;
-the exogenous variables of S are the variables in V not having direct causes in V;
-the variables in V are jointly independent if any two non-empty distinct subsets of V are probabilistically independent. Now the classic result beyond which Steel pretends to go can be stated:
Theorem 1 (Classic result) Acyclic deterministic systems with jointly independent exogenous variables satisfy the CMC.
Here is a proof for Theorem 1:
Let S be an acyclic deterministic system represented by {V, G, p}. Let us assume that the exogenous variables in V are jointly independent. S satises the CMC if and only if any variable in V is independent for p of its non-descendants in G conditional on its parents in G.
Then, let us consider any variable V in V and show that it is indeed independent of its non-descendants in G conditional on its parents in G.
-if V is endogenous, then its value is functionally determined by the values of its parents in G. Therefore it is independent of any of its non-descendants in G when one conditionalizes on the set of its parents in G;
-if V 1 is exogenous, the set of its parents in G is empty. Therefore one must simply show that V is (unconditionally) independent of any of its non-descendants in G. 
-E is a set of n equations such that each X i appears as a function f i of a non-empty subset of
-p is a probability distribution over U.
An example of an FM over
is composed by the equations:
together with a probability distribution p over {U 1 , U 2 }. 3 Now Steel (2005, 9) describes (E, p) causal" if 1) all the equations in E are causal generalizations and 2) any X i in X is such that the set DirectCauses(X i ) of its direct causes in (X ∪ U) is included in (but not necessarily equal to) the set of its functional parents in (X ∪ U).
Three remarks must be made before I can actually come to the result established by Steel:
-as noticed by Steel himself (2005, 7) , there is a straightforward correspondence between functional models and directed graphs": for an FM
such that graphical parents in G M exactly correspond to functional parents in E. For our example FM, the corresponding directed graph is as follows:
, then the equations in E can be restated in such a way that X variables are functions only of the U variables from which they descend (Steel 2005, 8) . As a consequence, p univocally extends to a probability distribution p over (U ∪ X), which itself univocally restricts to p over DC M .
In terms of CFMs and following the notations already introduced, the result established by Steel is the following:
If G M is acyclic and variables in U are jointly independent for p, then (CG M , p ) satises the Markov condition.
In terms of systems 4 , it can be formulated as:
Theorem 3 Let S be a system represented by the CFM M = (E, p) over (X, U). If S is acyclic and the variables in U are jointly independent for p, then S satises the CMC. The relationship between Steel's result and the determinism / indeterminism -CMC issue consists exactly in the following: CFMs can represent indeterministic as well as deterministic systems. In order to make it clear, Steel gives the following example:
Imagine a special type of car, the quantum car. The ignition of the quantum car works by means of a fundamentally indeterministic process: when the key is turned, there is an irreducible probability of .85 that the car will start. (Steel 2005, 13) Then Steel (2005, 13) explains that the system constituted by the quantum car" can be represented by a CFM M over ({X 1 , X 2 }, {U 1 , U 2 }), where -X 1 is a binary variable indicating whether the key is turned (X 1 = 1
indicates that it has been)";
-X 2 is a binary variable representing whether the car starts (X 2 = 1 indicates that it does)";
-(as far as I understand Steel's treatment of the example) U 1 represents the reasons why the car may be started;
-U 2 is a binary variable whose possible values are 0 and 1 and which represents whether the car starts once the key has been turned.
M is composed of the equations
together with a probability distribution p over {U 1 , U 2 } which is such that p(U 2 = 1) = .85. With p dened in this way, it becomes clear that U 2 represents the probabilistic nature of the action of X 1 on X 2 . More generally, the example makes it clear how any indeterministic system can be represented by a causal functional model, with U variables representing the probabilistic nature of the action of indeterministic causes on their eects. Consequently, Steel considers that Theorem 2 implies that the CMC is true for any acyclic system with jointly independent exogenous variables, be it deterministic or not. This is what I bring into question. More precisely, I question neither the truth of theorem 2, nor the validity of Steel's proof, but rather the way Steel interprets it.
Assessment of Steel's argument
Obviously, a necessary condition for Steel's result being interpretable in terms of any acyclic system with jointly independent exogenous variables satisfying the CMC is that the U variables of a CFM are the exogenous variables of systems represented by that CFM. This is assumed by Steel. Yet he has an hesitation when introducing them, referring to a set of exogenous variables or error terms" (Steel 2005, 5) . It seems to me that this hesitation is meaningful. But this can be justied only after I have told the standard story about exogenous variables, error terms, and the way they dier.
The standard denition of exogenous variables was introduced in Section 2.
One has 0) a system S, 1) a set V = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . V n } of variables representing its relevant observable aspects, 2) a graph CG representing the direct causal relations on V. The exogenous variables of S are those variables in V that do not have any parents in CG. All this has already been stated. But from there on one can go one step further in the representation of S and consider a set of n equations such that each V i constitutes the left-hand-side of exactly one equation and is a function of its parents in CG plus one variable T i . This set of equations together with the probability distribution over T constitutes a representation of the system under consideration which is common in the eld of causal modeling see for instance Pearl's causal models" (Pearl 2000, 27) . Therefore this pattern of representation will be referred to as that of standard causal functional models" (standard CFMs" for short It could be that all this does not matter much. This would be the case in particular if Steel showed the way towards a proof of the truth of the CMC for any system with jointly independent exogenous variables in the standard sense). More likely, it may be that this can be proved in a way similar to the proof proposed for Steel's result. This seems all the more likely since the given proof-sketch is modular and has already been used to produce a proof of a result which is quite dierent from Theorem 2 (Pearl 2000, 30) . Yet a quick examination of the sketch reveals that one can obtain a nal result in terms of joint independence of exogenous variables (standardly dened) only if one adopts a pattern of representation from which error terms are absent. But we saw that the rst part of the proof relies in an essential way on the functional determination of the values of the eects by those of their direct causes. In the absence of error terms, such functional determination is exactly equivalent to determinism. In other words, the proof-sketch is no use for one who wants to establish that all acyclic systems with jointly independent exogenous variables satisfy the CMC.
Of course this does not imply that the claim is false. What implies it by contrast is the fact that, under standard terminology, it remains possible for an acyclic system with jointly independent exogenous variables to fail to satisfy the CMC provided it is indeterministic. This is the case of Nancy Cartwright's classic example:
Cheap-but-Dirty employs a genuinely probabilistic process to produce the chemical [a chemical that is consumed in a given sewage plant]. The probability of getting the desired chemical on any day the factory operates is eighty percent. [...] [Moreover] pollutants are emitted as a by-product whenever the chemical is produced. (Cartwright 1999, 7) Relevant observable aspects of the systems are represented by three binary variables with value 0 or 1: O indicating whether Cheap-but-Dirty operates, S indicating whether sewage is produced, and P indicating whether pollutant is produced. It is easily seen that only one of them is exogenous in the standard sense: O. Hence, trivially, exogenous variables are jointly independent. Moreover, the system is clearly acyclic. And yet the system does not satisfy the CMC since O does not screen o P from S: p(P = 1, S = 1|O = 1) = .8, whereas p(P = 1|O = 1) × p(S = 1|O = 1) = .8 × .8 = .64. As a consequence, the result Steel claims to have established remains false under standard terminology.
Acyclicity and joint independence of exogenous variables are sucient for the CMC only if one accepts as exogenous variables, variables that represent the way probabilistic causes act on their eects. It could be argued that there is nothing wrong with this and, quite the opposite, that this modeling proposition constitutes the very innovation in Steel's paper. This is precisely the position adopted by Steel himself: The basic insight is that exogenous variables in an FM can be interpreted either as representing causes or genuine indeterminism" (Steel 2005, 4) . The matter is that variables representing the way probabilistic causes act on their eects already existed before Steel's paper, and that they were never called exogenous variables". Conversely, exogenous variables" and systems with jointly independent exogenous variables" already had a meaning before Steel's paper, and this meaning is dierent from the one they have in Steel 2005 . Moreover, Steel does not give any independent justication for substituting his interpretation of exogenous variables to the usual one. Then, his modeling innovation should not be accepted unless the associated terminology were carefully distinguished from the usual one and the author were careful not to claim to enter a pre-existing debate two things that Steel fails to do.
5 What Steel's paper suggests I would like to end with more positive considerations. Indeed I think that Steel's paper actually contributes to the CMC debate, in spite of the diculties hitherto highlighted. As the diculties, the contribution lies in Steel's U variables and, to be more precise, in those U variables that are neither exogenous variables nor error terms in the standard sense of these terms. I have already stated that those variables represent only one of the three kinds of inuences that standard error terms represent in one heap", and this appeared to be problematic. But there is another way of looking at this: while standard error terms clearly fail to represent any real entity, Steel's U variables lean towards realism in the use of error terms by which is meant that error terms are used in such a way that the structure of a causal model matches the real causal structure it represents. More specically, Steel's U variables suggest to disjoin the inuences that are represented in one heap" by standard error terms, and to represent distinct inuences by distinct error terms. These non-standard error terms lead to dene non-standard causal functional models. Given a system S whose relevant observable aspects are represented by
-E is a set of n equations such that each V i is the left-hand-side of exactly one equation and appears as a function of 1) its direct causes in V and 2) non-standard error terms
-p is the probability distribution over the set T of non-standard error terms.
Non-standard CFMs complete Steel's CFMs so as to ensure that everything standard CFMs represent is actually represented. This is enough for nonstandard CFMs not implying the important redenition of usual terminology that Steel's CFMs did convey, and that was identied as problematic. But as for the rest, the two patterns of representation are largely similar. First and foremost, non-standard CFMs allows a characterization of determinism that relies on the very intuition conveyed by Steel's Denition of Deterministic Functional Models" (Steel 2005, 9) : Denition 3 (Characterization of Determinism) A system is deterministic if it is represented by a non-standard causal functional model with no error term representing the way a probabilistic cause acts on one of its eects.
Then, as Steel's CFMs, non-standard CFMs are in straightforward correspondence" (Steel 2005, 7) with directed graphs. Accordingly, they and the systems they represent will also be labeled acyclic" when the corresponding directed graph is acyclic. Moreover, acyclicity of the non-standard CFM M = (E, p) over (V, T) remains sucient for the probability distribution p over T to univocally extend to p over (T ∪ V). Finally, and still as with Steel's CFMs, the graph G M corresponding to M is an over-graph of the causal graph for systems represented by M . Notice that this causal graph is now univocally determined by M (as the directed graph representing the direct causal relations amongst V variables that are depicted by E); therefore it can and will be noted: CG M ". Does this tell anything new about the relationship between determinism and the CMC? Here, one may rst notice that, under the notations that have just been introduced, the following result holds:
Theorem 4 Let M = (E, p) be an acyclic non-standard CFM over (V, T) and p the restriction of p to V. If variables in T are jointly independent, then (CG M , p ) satises the Markov condition.
Theorem 4 is the equivalent, in the framework of non-standard CFMs, of Steel's result. It holds for exactly the same reasons and can also be stated in terms of systems:
Theorem 5 Let S be a system represented by the non-standard CFM M over (V, T). If M is acyclic and variables in T are jointly independent, then S satises the CMC.
By way of illustration, let us consider a classic (non quantum) car, by which is meant a car that starts each time the key is turned and there is petrol in the tank. Let S be this system. Three variables are needed in order to represent S: V 1 representing whether the key is turned, V 2 representing whether there is petrol in the car and V 3 representing whether the car starts. Let M = (E, p) be the non-standard CFM representing S. Equations in E are as follows:
with T 1,1 representing the omitted causes of V 1 , T 1,2 the possible errors in the measurement of the value of V 1 , and correspondingly for V 2 and V 3 . Given acyclicity of S, Theorem 5 states that a sucient condition for it to satisfy the CMC is that the variables in {T 1,1 , T 1,2 , T 2,1 , T 2,2 , T 3,1 , T 3,2 } are jointly independent. Now, this condition can be rened. Indeed, and as already stressed by Cartwright (2001, 18) in another context, what is needed for a proof in the style of Pearl's one to be possible is only the joint independence of the net eects" of error terms. In our example, net eects" of error terms correspond to {T 1,1 , T 1,2 }, {T 2,1 , T 2,2 } and {T 3,1 , T 3,2 }. Then, following Cartwright, it is sucient that any way of combining them into two non-empty sets is in two independent sets of variables. To be explicit, it is sucient that:
} is too strong condition for a proof following the sketch given above to be available. In particular it is not necessary for T 1,1 to be independent from T 1,2 , for T 2,1 to be independent from T 2,2 , or for T 3,1 to be independent from T 3,2 .
Stated in terms of a non-standard CFM M over (V, T), the proof only requires the following: for any two distinct non-empty V , V ⊂ V, the sets of error terms respectively corresponding to the variables in V and to the variables in V are independent. More rigorously, and with ϕ(i) the number of error terms in M for V i ∈ V, the result is as follows:
Theorem 6 Let M = (E, p) be an acyclic non-standard CFM over V. If It is hard to see why deterministic causal systems would be more likely acyclic than indeterministic ones (Steel 2005, 16 ), I will explain why deterministic systems are more likely than indeterministic ones to have non-standard CFMs satisfying JI. To that eect, let me introduce a system S which is identical to the previously introduced S except for the fact that turning the key has an irreducible probability of .85" of doing its job (exactly as in Steel's quantum example). S is represented by non-standard CFM M = (E , q). Under previous notations, equations in E are:
with T 3,3 a binary variable with possible values 0 and 1 and such that q(T 3,3 = 1) = .85.
As a result, M satises JI if:
Now suppose that all these independencies hold. Then, the independencies stated by (1) to (4) all hold. This stems from the simple probabilistic following fact: for any two sets of variables Y and Z and any variable V , if Y ∪ {V } is independent from Z, then Y is independent from Z. Then, if M satises JI, then M does too. Now, the converse is not true: {T 1,1 , T 1,2 } (for instance) can be independent from {T 3,1 , T 3,2 } while not being independent from {T 3,1 , T 3,2 , T 3,3 }.
These are no facts particular the chosen example. Indeed, the example makes clear that for any two S and S diering only by the probabilistic nature of some causal relations in S , the non-standard CFMs M and M representing them dier only by the absence from M of the non-standard error terms standing for indeterminism in M . In such a case, M satises JI if M does while the converse does not hold. In this sense, non-standard CFMs representing deterministic systems are more likely than non-standard CFMs representing indeterministic systems to satisfy JI. To this exact and acknowledgedly narrow extent, determinism is more favorable a context than indeterminism for the truth of the CMC.
Conclusion
Steel's claim to enlarge the usual result concerning the relationship between determinism and the CMC from the deterministic to the general case revealed unacceptable. More precisely, it was shown that Result 2 can be interpreted in terms of satisfaction of the CMC by any system with jointly independent exogenous variables only if one uses the expression exogenous variables" in an uncommon way. Still, this way of using the expression suggested that error terms could be employed in a way more realist than the standard one. I dened the pattern of representation that stems from this suggestion, and explained how the determinism -CMC debate can take advantage of this new framework. Determinism was easily characterized in this framework and a sense in which determinism is more favorable than indeterminism for the CMC appeared: the sucient condition we have for the truth of the CMC is such that if two systems dier only by determinism, then the deterministic one satises the condition whenever the indeterministic one does and the converse does not hold.
Hinting at non-standard causal functional models" and at Denition 3 probably constitute the most signicant contribution of Steel 2005 to the debate concerning the CMC in general, and its relationship to determinism in particular. But this denition, as well as the sucient condition for the truth of the CMC that was derived from it, are valid only for systems represented by causal functional models non-standard" ones in the case in point. Hence, this denition and this condition are useful exactly in as much as causal functional models can represent real systems, and are there interesting exactly in as much as causal functional models can represent interesting real systems. Whether they can is a dicult question that is not tackled here and would deserve more attention.
